

NEVER AGAIN



MOSS LANDING

**Empty Words & Hollow Deeds From Our
State & Federal Authorities**

NEVER AGAIN MOSS LANDING - March 17, 2026

MISSING IN ACTION SINCE THE JANUARY 16, 2025 MOSS LANDING FIRE:

Since the fire, has the U.S EPA, which is responsible for inside the fence pollution characterization and clean up provided all testing results for pollution sampling results on the Vistra property?

- #1 The fire fighting and suppression water used to fight the initial as well as re-ignition fires
- #2 The black fire residue pile stretching 700 feet along the length of the destroyed building
- #3 Surface or air samples taken over in the last twelve months.

Both the EPA and DTSC continue to promote flawed, inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading data and statements:

- #1 EPA on 1/20/2025: “Everything was Destroyed” A Factually misleading statement that has not been rescinded or publicly corrected.
- #2 EPA air, water, and soils sampling used flawed and incorrect methodologies. Their claims have been proven inaccurate, yet no explanation has been offered for factual discrepancies.
- #3 DTSC limited testing results used flawed and incorrect methodology. They have abandoned further testing.

ONLY NAML HAS SHOWN UP WITH INVESTIGATION RESULTS & RECOMMENDED FIXES

Our local community volunteer group is the only entity in California to complete an investigation of how and why the Moss Landing fire occurred.

12 Recommended Fixes for the Proposed MoCo Ordinance:

#1 Only allow outdoor BESS Storage.

#2 Conduct a 4-part Fire Safety Inspection sequence by a County-selected 3rd party or local fire department before approval is given for the operator to begin energy storage.

- of the to-be-built blueprints of the designed storage layout,
- of the as-built outdoor storage layout blueprint, showing changes from the original layout design
- of the built energy storage layout.
- of the CPUC safety inspection results.

#3 The BESS operator must inform and coordinate with the county permitting body, as well as fire and emergency response agencies on how to handle/respond to the worst-case uncontrollable thermal runaway fire scenario.

#4 The BESS operator must conduct an environmental impact report (EIR) and then inform and coordinate with the county permitting body and health department about the risks to the public and sensitive environmental sites for the worst-case uncontrollable thermal runaway fire scenario.

#5 The outer edge of storage containers must be set back at least a half-mile from the following local sites: hospitals, care centers, schools, residential developments, and environmental preserves or sanctuaries.

#6 The BESS operator must use an energy storage battery or mechanism safer than NMC lithium-ion batteries. (NAML has identified 10 alternative industrial scale technologies underdevelopment / deployment)

#7 The BESS operator cannot install or operate zero-separation islands with shoulder-to-shoulder, double-stacked, and double-backed racks.

#8 Require 2 million gallons of standby external fire suppression water to be immediately available in case of an uncontrollable thermal runaway fire. (The Otay Mesa required 8,000,000 gallons to prevent adjoining containers from being engulfed by a single container fire at the outdoor 250MW facility.)

#9 The operator must conduct an operational test and report the results of the fire suppression water system and water funneling network to the water suppression containment tanks.


#10 The BESS operator must provide, maintain and annually test 2 onsite drones. One is to send aerial views to the local fire, sheriff/police, and emergency response agencies in case of a storage incident or fire. The second drone must gather air/moisture samples of smoke vapor, cloud, and plume during the incident or fire.

#11 The BESS operator must provide, maintain and annually test an onsite or nearby spectrometer to analyze the air and moisture samples gathered during the incident or fire by the sampling drone, then immediately report the results to the local fire, sheriff, police, and health agencies for use in determining how to protect the public.

#12 To prevent dangerous degrading of operational batteries, monthly report to the fire and county emergency response agencies Transparent Real-time Independent Monitoring (TRIM) for loading levels, above 80% and below 20% of individual batteries, highlighting concerning degradation and batteries that should be removed from storage.

Vistra created densely-packed double-stacked double-backed storage Islands.
They did not install the required fire stop.

Density = Profit. Vistra valued profit above Safety.



60 storage Islands held 100,000 modules

Narrow 4-foot-wide aisle spacing & no intervening fire-stop walls/rooms AS REQUIRED

Vistra Community Meeting Presentation: Mar & April 2024



4,500 racks each contained 22 Modules weighing in at 200 lbs each = 20,000,000 pounds of batteries = 10,000 tons of toxic materials in the building
not including Containers and electronics.

Estimates are that over 60% of the batteries were destroyed.

Why was Vistra's indoor storage-Island aisle spacing **twice as narrow** as PG&E's outdoor aisle spacing and **twice as dense with double-stacking & double-backing**?

4 ft Indoor Aisle width
Between 60 10.5-foot-high Island-Units



PUC Smoke & Suppression Incident
report page F-19 Sept 4, 2021
& TR1300 rack dimensions chart

8 ft aisle width between 7-foot-high Row-Units: Similar to Otay Mesa facility



April 2021 drone image provided by PG&E of Tesla Megapack system in Moss Landing

The Result of a Flawed and Failed Storage Design



The building's suppression system **failed to suppress or contain**

The explosion and fire smoke was **laden with toxins covering thousands of acres and affecting thousands.**

The incident was a danger to first responders and to local communities. Health impacts continue to this day.

The **PUC failed its duty to oversee facility installation and operations**

The **DTSC has failed to update testing after provided with proof of widespread contamination**

The **EPA has actively misled the public about the contamination distributed on site and during the explosion**

**OUR AUTHORTIES HAVE FAILED TO
PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND WELFARE**

Proof of Elkhorn Slough Environmental Pollution and Heavy metal vaporized materials descending upon Monterey County

Nov 26, 2025 *Scientific Reports* published Dr. Aiello's peer-reviewed data showing a vaporized cloud of highly toxic metals and PFAs from the fire distributed **27 tons of heavy metals** onto the Elkhorn Slough.

A minimum 6,000 tons of vaporized toxins were contained and released from the destroyed batteries.

Where did the rest of that material go?

Vistra, the EPA, and the DTSC say

“Nothing to worry about here folks.”


CHRONIC ILLNESS STALKS US.

Over 647 NAML Facebook Members
Reported minor to significant Symptoms

From Santa Cruz to Salinas, to Pacific
Grove and Down Valley to Greenfield

HUNDREDS WERE SICKENED.
THOUSANDS INHALED THE
SAME TOXIC BREW.


EPA & DTSC TO MOCO:
NOTHING TO SEE HERE.



THE TOXIC CLOUD SPREAD:

The primary data source for our plume analysis was the series of HYSPLIT models included in Emergency Operation Plans (EOPs) 2, 3, 4, and 5. To supplement gaps on the morning of January 18, 2025, we incorporated HYSPLIT modeling conducted by a Dr. Peter Weiss of UCSC.

After a CPRA request to county staff, an internal email indicated hazardous levels of PM_{2.5} during that period. Notably, the air monitor used to estimate hydrogen fluoride (HF) levels was non-functional that morning in the areas with high PM. This malfunction was not an isolated incident: HF data was missing approximately 40% of the time.



California State Authorities and the EPA are AWOL:

Zero California State vapor, plume, or downwind cloud sampling.
No Health or Environmental Teams.

Zero EPA sampling results publicly reported from
inside the fence surrounding the Vistra burn site.

Zero further testing by State or Federal Authorities.

EPA is relying upon Vistra's Consultant: Terraphase.

- The Phase 2 Terraphase study conducted in September 2025, concluded that there was no significant environmental impact directly attributable to the January 2025 fire.
- **Metals & Pollutants:** While metals, PAHs, and dioxins were detected, the report states they were not caused by the fire and were not at levels high enough to affect humans or wildlife.
- **"Marsh Geochemistry" Defense:** The report attributed higher metal concentrations in certain areas to natural "marsh geochemistry" rather than aerial deposition from the fire plume. Dr. Aiello's peer reviewed data proves Terraphase's conclusions are false.
- **Surface Water:** Sampling of surface water and sediment near the facility (including Moss Landing Harbor and nearby sloughs) found levels "below the human health risk" thresholds according to the County Environmental Health Bureau.

THE FACTS STATE OTHERWISE and it is important to note that Terraphase's tests were performed fully eight months after the fire distributed material across the test area.

Terraphase and State Sampling is Flawed.

- **The "Thin Dust Layer":** SJSU researchers identified a "very thin dust layer" (2 to 5 mm deep) containing heavy metals like nickel, manganese, and cobalt at levels 10 to 1,000 times higher than pre-fire levels. These tests occurred days after the initial fire.
- **Samples provide pre-fire baseline testing data:** Terraphase's report fails to address mud sampling done before and after the fire showing up to 1000-fold increases in the presence and distribution of battery materials in the slough.
- **Sampling Methodology Gap:** Critics point out that Vistra's Phase 2 sampling dug 76 mm (3 inches) into the soil. This diluted the fire-related contaminants by mixing them with deeper, cleaner soil, whereas the SJSU and NAML studies specifically targeted the top few millimeters where fire ash would settle. Those studies occurred before winter rains on 1.26.25. Months of environmental degradation would have further diluted the Terraphase sampling.

Terraphase is Compromised. Yet EPA sees them as a Partner.

- Terraphase Engineering, Inc. is a private environmental consulting firm that has become a go-to partner for industrial giants facing complex environmental crises and high-stakes redevelopment. Founded in 2010 and headquartered in Oakland, California, the firm specializes in navigating the intersection of engineering, hazardous waste remediation, and legal defense.
- Terraphase is often characterized by its "strategic" approach to environmental reporting, which critics argue is designed to minimize corporate liability while remaining within the technical bounds of regulatory compliance. A recurrent example of this is the "Natural Geochemistry" Argument. In several high-profile cases,
- Terraphase has been criticized for asserting that detected contaminants are "naturally occurring" or pre-existing rather than results of the disaster they are investigating. At Moss Landing, their Phase 2 report attributed heavy metal spikes in the marsh to natural geochemistry, a finding that clashed with independent SJSU research showing a distinct, fire-deposited ash layer.

The EPA is relying upon Vistra and its contractors including Terraphase to conduct testing, mitigation planning, and materials removal.

- The Terraphase record does not reflect a commitment to determine cause and effect at other industrial disaster sites.
- Terraphase has provided conclusions that are directly contradicted by Dr. Aiello's and Never Again Moss Landing's scientifically validated results.
- Terraphase's employment by Vistra presents an inherent conflict of interest.
- The fact that Vistra's "official" (Phase 2) report suggests no harm while independent local scientists find massive heavy metal spikes.
- THESE FACTS prove the necessity for citizen engagement and participation in an ordinance formulation process that focuses upon the **public health, safety, and welfare.**

So, How's this all Sitting With You?

What is Your Trust Factor?



We Invite you to join us in our skepticism of the "Official Line."
OUR COUNTY NEEDS A ROBUST PUBLIC SAFETY ORDINANCE